However, it is important not to fetishize this dichotomy. With a few exceptions, neither the hypotheses described nor their respective authors purport to explain the executive`s motivations in a way that results in particularly strong policy recommendations. Instead, most commentators, when formulating the assumptions, are open to the idea that the role of the treaty can only be fully explained by taking into account several of the proposed mechanisms. 33 Yoo, John C., Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional Executive Agreements, 99 Moi. L. Rev. 757 (2001) (argument both against the “transformists” introducing the idea of constitutional moments and against the “exclusivitists”, who consider treaties as the only way to adopt binding international agreements). 44,108 AJIL Unbound (2014), available from www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/ajil-unbound; see also Bradley, note 9 above, at 85 (in agreement with Hathaway, that the difference in the use of contracts and executive agreements does not reflect apparent logic). In each model specification, the coefficient on the contractual indicator is negative and is significantly different from zero. Note that coefficients in survival models change the probability of an event, i.e. The danger rate, express it. Here, the event is defined as an agreement that ends.
Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates a decrease in the likelihood that an agreement will be cancelled if it is concluded in the form of a treaty. The results imply that contracts take much longer than executive agreements and that the difference in sustainability is not the result of arbitrary factual conventions or a by-product of a decision-making process determined primarily by the Senate seat card. In Table 5, the same model specifications are executed using the concurrent complementary log-log model. Here, too, the results consistently show that agreements concluded in the form of treaties outlive those concluded as executive agreements. The results therefore do not depend on the specific characteristics of the Cox model, but are also robust compared to other model specifications. The results of this article not only confirm the importance of the treaty as a political instrument, but also have implications for current debates about the presidential power to withdraw from international agreements. . .